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ON THE EXISTENCE OF PURE STRATEGY MONOTONE
EQUILIBRIA IN ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
BY PHILIP J. RENY AND SHMUEL ZAMIR1
We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions
in ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and afﬁliated
one-dimensionalsignals.Byextendingamonotonicity resultduetoMilgromandWeber
(1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or
when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of
ever ﬁner ﬁnite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by
recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples
suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-
price auctions.
KEYWORDS: First-price auction, monotone equilibrium, pure strategy.
1. INTRODUCTION
THERE IS BY NOW a large literature on ﬁrst-price auctions. While initial efforts
centered around the symmetric bidder case (e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1982)),
attention has begun to shift toward the even more challenging—and in prac-
tice often very relevant—case of asymmetric bidders. Akey difference between
the two cases is that only the symmetric bidder setting admits closed-form ex-
pressions forequilibrium bid functions.Because of this, analysis of equilibrium
bidding behavior in asymmetric ﬁrst-price auctions requires an implicit charac-
terization of equilibrium through ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for optimal
bidding.2 But if an equilibrium fails to exist, such an analysis is vacuous.
Our objective here is to provide conditions ensuring the existence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium in nondecreasing bid functions for asymmetric ﬁrst-price
auctions with afﬁliated private information and interdependent values. As a
by-product, we therefore provide a foundation for the ﬁrst-order approach to
analyzing equilibrium bidding behavior in such auctions.
Recent work on the question of equilibrium existence in ﬁrst-price auctions
can be found in Athey (2001), Bresky (1999), Jackson and Swinkels (2003),
Lebrun (1996, 1999), Lizzeri and Persico (2000), Maskin and Riley (2000), and
Reny (1999).3 But there appears to be a common difﬁculty. The above papers
1We are grateful to four referees for very helpful comments and suggestions and to the editor,
whose synthesis of the referees’ remarks and whose insightful questions led us to develop and in-
clude substantive new material. We also thank Eric Maskin for carefully reading several previous
drafts and providing detailed comments leading to signiﬁcant expositional improvements. Reny
gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the National Science Foundation (SES-9905599
and SES-0214421).
2See, for example, Bajari (1997).
3For conditions ensuring uniqueness in two-bidder settings, see Lizzeri and Persico (2000),
Maskin and Riley (1996), and Rodriguez (2000). Under more restrictive conditions, Maskin and
Riley (1996) obtain some uniqueness results for more than two bidders. See also Bajari (1997)
and Lebrun (1999).
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restrict attention either to two bidders, symmetric bidders, independent sig-
nals, private values, or commonvalues. That is, the mostgeneral case involving
three or more asymmetric bidders with afﬁliated signals and interdependent
values is not covered. The reason forthis is that standard proof techniques rely
on the following single-crossing condition (SCC) exploited with great ingenuity
in Athey (2001):
If the others employ nondecreasing bidfunctions and one’sp a y o f ff r o mah i g hb i di sn os m a l l e r
thanthatfromalower bid,thenthehighbidremainsasgoodastheloweronewhenone’ssign al
rises.4
However, even when bidders’ signals are afﬁliated, SCC can fail (see Sec-
tion 3) unless there is but a single other bidder (as in the two-bidder case),
or all signals are symmetric and bidders employ the same bidding function (as
in the symmetric case), or signals are independent, or values are either purely
private or purely common. It is for this reason that a general result is not yet
at hand.
While our main contribution is the existence result, there are two other con-
tributions of note. One of these is our characterization of the precisely two
ways that SCC can fail for a bidder. The ﬁrst failure occurs when the two bids
beingcomparedare bothindividuallyirrational,each yieldingthe biddera neg-
ative expected payoff. The second failure occurs when one of the two bids ties
for the winning bid with positive probability.
A second contribution is a new method for establishing single-crossing when
these two potential failures are ruled out. The new method is based upon an
extension of an important result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982) for nonde-
creasing functions;theextensionappliesto a class offunctionsthatneednotbe
nondecreasing. Using the new method, we establish the following individually
rational tieless single-crossing condition (IRT-SCC) for ﬁrst-price auctions:
If the others employ nondecreasing bid functions and one’sp a y o f ff r o mah i g hb i di sn o n n e g -
ative and no smaller than that from a lower bid, then the high bid remains as good as the
lower one when one’s signal rises so long as neither bid ties for the winning bid with positive
probability.5
Once this result is in hand, it is possible to adapt Athey’s (2001) ﬁnite-
action proof techniques to establish the existence of a pure-strategy monotone
equilibrium in our ﬁrst-price auction setting when each bidder is restricted to
choose a bid from a ﬁnite set, but where the only common bid for distinct
bidders is nonserious. The proof is completed by showing that the limit of
any sequence of such equilibria, as the bidders’ ﬁnite grids become dense in
their unrestricted bid sets, is a pure monotone equilibrium of the model with
4This is only “half” of the condition. The other half is obtained by reversing the roles of
“high(er)” and “low(er),” and replacing “rises” with “falls.” See Section 2 for a formal deﬁni-
tion.
5Once again, this is only half of the condition and the other half is obtained as before. See
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unrestricted bids.6 While employing such a limit argument is not novel, the
combination of interdependent values and afﬁliated private information ren-
ders a particular property of the uniform tie-breaking rule critical to this part
of the argument. By identifying this property, this portion of our proof may
also be of some value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
class of ﬁrst-price auctions covered here, provides the assumptions we main-
tain throughout, and contains our main result. This section also provides a
discussion of Athey’s (2001) single crossing condition (SCC) and introduces
our individually rational tieless single crossing condition (IRT-SCC). Section 3
provides examples of the two ways Athey’s (2001) single crossing condition
can fail. Section 4 provides both a sketch of the proof of IRT-SCC as well as
our extension of Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) monotonicity theorem, upon
which the proof is based. Section 5 provides a private value example suggest-
ing that one-dimensionality of the bidders’ signals is essential for the existence
of monotone pure-strategy equilibria in the class of ﬁrst-price auctions stud-
ied here, and Section 6 shows that our existence result for ﬁrst-price auctions
cannot be extended to second-price auctions. All proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
2. THE MODEL AND MAIN RESULT
Consider the following ﬁrst-price auction game. There is a single object for
sale and N ≥ 2 bidders. Each bidder i receives a private signal si ∈[ 0 1]  The
joint density of the bidders’ signals is f :[0 1]N → R+. After receiving their
signals, each bidder i submits a sealed bid from Bi ={ l}∪[ ri ∞) ⊆ R  where
l<r i for all i  Either l alone or both l and ri may be negative. The bidder i
submitting the highest bid greater than l wins the object, with ties broken ran-
domly and uniformly.7 Hence, ri is bidder i’s reserve price and l  being a bid
that always loses, corresponds to a decision not to participate. For example,
t h ec a s eo fac o m m o nr e s e r v ep r i c eo fz e r oc o r r e s p o n d st ori = 0f o ra l li and
l<0  We shall call bids in [ri ∞) serious bids,a n ds ol is the only nonserious
bid.
If the vector of signals is s = (s1     s N) and bidder i wins the object with a
bid of bi  then bidder i’s payoff is given by ui(bi s) All other bidders receive
6Jackson and Swinkels (2003) employ Jackson, Swinkels, Simon, and Zame (2002) to establish
the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in a large class of private-value auctions. Applying
Jackson et al. (2002) in our setting yields the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium with an
endogenous tie-breaking rule. This equilibrium need not be pure,nondecreasing, or an equilibrium
under the standard tie-breaking rule. Consequently, this route does not appear to be fruitful for
our purposes.
7Any tie-breaking rule with the property that a high bidder’s probability of winning is non-
increasing in the others’ bids will do. In particular, the probability of winning need not be log-
supermodular in the vector of bids as in Athey (2001).1108 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
a payoff of zero. This speciﬁcation allows for a variety of attitudes toward risk,
as well as a variety of payment rules.
We shall maintain the following assumptions. For all bidders i = 1     N:
ASSUMPTION A.1: (i) ui:[ri ∞) ×[ 0 1]N → R is measurable, ui(bi s) is
bounded in s ∈[ 0 1]N for each bi ≥ri and continuous in bi for each s 
(ii) There exists ˜ b ≥ ri such that ui(bi s)<0 for all bi > ˜ b and all s ∈[ 0 1]N.
(iii) For every bi ≥ ri u i(bi s) is nondecreasing in s−i and strictly increasing
in si 
(iv) ui(¯ bi s)−ui(bi s)is nondecreasing in s whenever ¯ bi >b i ≥ ri 
ASSUMPTION A.2: (i) f(s)is measurable and strictly positive on [0 1]N.
(ii) f(s∨ s )f(s ∧ s ) ≥ f(s)f(s ) for all s s  ∈[ 0 1]N  where ∨ and ∧ denote
component-wise maximum and minimum, respectively.
REMARK 1: This model does not cover settings in which bidders must ﬁrst
commit to participate before receiving their signals and then submit bids at or
above their reserve price after receiving their signals. While such prior com-
mitment is unusual in practice, our results hold even in this case so long as
each bidder i has a feasible bid guaranteeing a nonnegative payoff conditional
on winning (e.g., if ui(ri s)≥ 0f o ra l ls).
REMARK 2: According to Assumption A.1(iii), it is not necessary that
ui(bi s)decrease in bi  only that it is eventually negative for large enough bi 
Thus, while we require the winner to be the highest bidder, we do not require
the winner to pay his bid, nor even an amount that is an increasing function of
his bid. It is important, however, that the winner’s payment depend only upon
his own bid.
REMARK 3: Note that Assumption A.1(iv) is satisﬁed automatically when
bidder i is risk neutral and the winner must pay his bid because in this case
ui(bi s)= wi(s)−bi and so the difference expressed in A.1(iv) is constant in s 
More generally, if ui(bi s)= Ui(wi(s) − bi)  then A.1(iv) holds when wi(s) is
nondecreasing in s and U  
i ≤ 0 (i.e., bidder i is risk averse).
REMARK 4: Assumption A.2(i) implies that, given any si  the support of i’s
conditional distribution on the others’ signals is [0 1]N−1  A.2(ii) requires the
bidders’ signals to be afﬁliated (see Milgrom and Weber (1982)).
Given a vector of bids b = (b1     b N) ∈× iBi  let vi(b s) denote bidder i’s
expected payoff when the vector of signals is s  That is,
vi(b s) =
  1
m
ui(bi s) if m = #{j:bj = bi = maxkbk >l}≥1,
0o t h e r w i s e .ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1109
Note that this speciﬁcation implies that a lone bid equal to one’s reserve price
is a winning bid.
Throughout,the uppercase letter Si willdenotebidderi’s signalas arandom
variable whilethe lower case letter si will denoteits realization. A pure strategy
for bidder i is a measurable (bid) function bi:[0 1]→Bi  Given a vector of
pure strategies b = (b1     bN)  let Vi(b) denote bidder i’s (ex-ante) expected
payoff in the auction. That is,
Vi(b) = E[vi(b(S) S)] 
where b(S) denotes the random vector (b1(S1)     bN(SN)) and the expecta-
tion is taken with respect to f  It will also be convenient to deﬁne bidder i’s
interim payoff. Accordingly, let Vi(bi b−i|si) denote bidder i’s expected payoff
conditional on his signal si and given that he bids bi and the others employ the
strategies b−i  That is,
Vi(bi b−i|si) = E[vi(bi b−i(S−i) si S −i)|Si = si] 
8
Apure-strategyequilibriumisanN-tupleofpurestrategies b∗ = (b∗
1     b∗
N)
such that for all bidders i  Vi(b∗) ≥ Vi(b 
i b∗
−i) for all pure strategies b 
i; or
equivalently, for every i and a.e. si V i(b∗
i(si) b∗
−i|si) ≥ Vi(bi b∗
−i|si) for every
bi ∈ Bi 
Our interest lies in establishing, for any ﬁrst-price auction game, the ex-
istence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in which each bidder’s bid function is
nondecreasing in his signal. We shall refer to this as a monotone pure-strategy
equilibrium. This brings us to our main result.
THEOREM2.1: All ﬁrst-priceauctiongames satisfying Assumptions A.1andA.2
possess a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.
REMARK 5: Suppose that for each pair of distinct bidders, i and j,t h e
strictly increasing function φi
j(·) maps R onto R,a n dφi
j and φ
j
i are mutual
inverses. With obvious modiﬁcations, the proof of Theorem 2.1 is valid un-
der the more general rule that any serious bid bi by i is among the highest
if bi ≥ maxj =iφi
j(bj) with ties broken uniformly when there is more than one
high bidder. Hence, Theorem 2.1 extends, for example, to settings in which the
auction rules favor a subset of bidders by increasing their effective bids against
those outside the subset.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is in the Appendix and consists of two main steps.
The ﬁrst step establishes that a monotone equilibrium exists when bidders are
8All statements involving conditional probabilities are made with respect to the following
version of the conditional density: f(s −i|si) = f(s)/
 
[0 1]N−1 f(s i s −i)ds −i  which, by Assump-
tion A.2(i), is well deﬁned.1110 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
restricted to ﬁnite sets of bids with only the nonserious bid l in common, while
the second step shows that the limit of such equilibria, as each bidder i’s set of
permissiblebidsbecomesdensein Bi  isanequilibriumwhen,foreachbidder i,
any bid in Bi is feasible.
The novelty of our approach lies in the ﬁrst step, where standard techniques
have up to nowfailed.Forexample,itwouldbe straightforward to establish the
existence of a monotone equilibrium with ﬁnite bid sets if one could establish
the single-crossingconditionemployedin Athey (2001).One couldthen simply
appeal directly to Athey’s Theorem 1.
In the context of our ﬁrst-price auction, Athey’s (2001) single-crossing con-
dition is as follows. For any bidder i  any feasible bids bi and b 
i  and any non-
decreasing bid functions bj for all bidders j  = i  the following must hold:
SCC: If Vi(b 
i b−i|si) ≥ Vi(bi b−i|si), then this inequality is maintained when
si rises if b 
i >b i, while it is maintained when si falls if b 
i <b i 
Unfortunately,Athey’s (2001)resultcannotbeappliedbecause, forarbitrary
ﬁnite or inﬁnite bid sets, SCC can fail in two ways (see Section 3). First, SCC
canfailwhenthere are ties atwinningbidsandthisis whywemustapproximate
the bidders’ bid sets with ﬁnite sets whose only common bid is the losing bid, l.
Second, SCC can fail if a bidder employs an individually irrational bid, that
is, a bid yielding a negative expected payoff against the others’ strategies. But
this failure of SCC doesnot pose a problem for us because the heart of Athey’s
(2001) proof technique nonetheless applies. To see this, recall that Athey em-
ploys SCC only to establish that when the others use monotone strategies,
a bidder’s best-reply correspondence, as a function of his signal, is increas-
ing in the strong set order.9 10 Because our ﬁnite bid sets include the losing
bid l, best replies are necessarily individually rational. Consequently, strong
set-order monotonicity can be established as in Athey (2001) so long as SCC
holds for bids that are best replies. That is, the failure of SCC for individually
irrational bids is immaterial for establishing strong set-order monotonicity of
the best-reply correspondence whenever each bidder has a bid that guarantees
a nonnegative payoff.
Consequently, the existence of a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium can be
established in a ﬁrst-price auction with our particular ﬁnite-bid set approxima-
tion if SCC can be established whenever ties at winning bids are absent and the
9That is, in this one-dimensional setting, if a high bid is best at a low signal and a low bid is best
at a high signal, then both bids are best at both signals. (Milgrom and Shannon (1994) introduced
the strong set order into the economics literature and, using it, established a number of important
comparative statics results.)
10Athey’s (2001) convexity results then apply and existence follows, as Athey shows, from
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two relevant bids are best replies. We in fact establish a single-crossing condi-
tion that is stronger than this restricted form of SCC (but of course weaker
than SCC itself), which, a fortiori, sufﬁces for our purposes.
The following individually rational tieless single-crossing condition
(IRT-SCC) requires that, in addition to the absence of ties at winning bids,
one of the two relevant bids be individually rational, but neither bid need be a
best reply.
DEFINITION 2.2: A ﬁrst-price auction satisﬁes IRT-SCC if for each bidder i 
all pairs of bids bi b  
i ∈ Bi  and all nondecreasing bid functions bj :[0 1]→Bj
of the other bidders such that Pr(l < maxj =ibj(Sj) = bi or b 
i) = 0,the following
condition is satisﬁed:
If Vi(b 
i b−i|si) ≥ 0a n dVi(b 
i b−i|si) ≥ Vi(bi b−i|si)  then the second inequal-
ity is maintained when si rises if b 
i >b i  while it is maintained when si falls if
b 
i <b i 
The main contribution leading to the proof of Theorem 2.1 is the following
proposition. Its proof can be found in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 2.3: Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, a ﬁrst-price auction sat-
isﬁes IRT-SCC.
REMARK 6: It can in fact be shown that, given individual rationality, the
single-crossing inequality is maintained even if ties occur at the higher of the
two bids b 
i and bi  It is only ties at the lower of the two bids that cause
single-crossing to fail. This tighter characterization might prove useful in
understanding when all equilibria must be monotone. (See McAdams (2003)
for some work in this direction.)
We next illustrate the two ways that SCC can fail.
3. THE TWO FAILURES OF SINGLE-CROSSING
In each of the two examples below, there are three bidders, each with a zero
reserve price, and the joint distribution of their signals is as follows.
Bidders i = 1 2h a v es i g n a l s ,si  that are i.i.d. uniform on [0 1]  These are
drawn ﬁrst. Bidder 3’s signal, s3  is drawn from [0 1] conditional on 1’s signal
according to the density
g(s3|s1) =
 1i f s1 ≤ 1/2,
2/3i f s1 > 1/2a n ds3 ≤ 1/2,
4/3i f s1 > 1/2a n ds3 > 1/2.
Thus, 3’s signal is uniform on [0 1] if s1 ≤ 1/2. If s1 > 1/2  then 3’s signal is
twice as likely to be above 1/2a sb e l o w1 /2, but is otherwise uniformly distrib-
uted on each of the two halves of the interval [0 1]  So deﬁned, the bidders’
signals are afﬁliated.1112 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
FIGURE 1.—1’s payoff distribution.
The examples will be constructed so that SCC fails for bidder 1. Conse-
quently, bidders 2 and 3 can, for example, be given private values. In each
example, Bidder 1’s utility will take the quasilinear form u1(b s) = w1(s) − b 
where, for v0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤v3 
w1(s1 s 2 s 3) =

   
   
v3 if (s2 s 3) ∈
 
1
2 1
 
×
 
1
2 1
 
,
v2 if (s2 s 3) ∈
 
1
2 1
 
×
 
0 
1
2
 
,
v1 if (s2 s 3) ∈
 
0 
1
2
 
×
 
1
2 1
 
,
v0 if (s2 s 3) ∈
 
0 
1
2
 
×
 
0 
1
2
 
.
Figure1illustratesboththedistribution oftheothers’ signalsconditionalon1’s
signal,andbidder1’svalueforthegood,w1(s1 s 2 s 3) asafunctionoftheother
bidders’ signals.11 In each panel, the numbers in square brackets are the prob-
abilities of each of the four regions conditional on 1’s signal. In panel (a) 1’s
signal is low (i.e., 1/2 or less), while in panel (b) it is high (i.e., above 1/2). In
both panels, the joint density of s2 and s3 is uniform within each region.
The two failures of SCC result from two distinct speciﬁcations of the values
v0 v 1 v 2  and v3 
11Note that w1(s) is nondecreasing in s  but, contrary to A.1, it is independent of s1  This is for
simplicity only. Adding εs1 to w1(s)  for ε>0 small enough, renders 1’s utility strictly increasing
in his signal and maintains the failure of SCC in both examples.ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1113
3.1. The First Failure: Individually Irrational Bids
Consider the following values:
v0 = 1 v 1 = 2 v 2 = 8 v 3 = 9 
Suppose also that bidders 2 and 3 each employ a strictly increasing bidding
function that speciﬁes a bid of 5 at the signal 1/2 and a bid of 6 at the signal 1.
Now consider two signals, s1 and ¯ s1  for bidder 1 such that s1 < 1/2< ¯ s1  Given
the bid functions of bidders 2 and 3, bidder 1 is indifferent between bidding
5a n d6w h e nh i ss i g n a li ss1  but considers bidding 5 as strictly better than
bidding 6 when 1’s signal increases to ¯ s1 (see below). This of course violates
SCC.
Furthermore, both bids, 5 and 6  are individually irrational for bidder 1
whether his signal is high or low. As we have already indicated, without ties
in bids this is the only way that single-crossing can fail. The requisite calcula-
tions follow:
V1(b1 = 6 b2 b3|s1) =
1
4
(9+8+2+1)−6 =− 1 
V1(b1 = 5 b2 b3|s1) =
1
4
(1−5) =− 1 
V1(b1 = 6 b2 b3|¯ s1) =
 
1
3
9+
1
6
8+
1
3
2+
1
6
1
 
−6=−
5
6
 
V1(b1 = 5 b2 b3|¯ s1) =
1
6
(1−5) =−
2
3
 
3.2. The Second Failure: Ties at Winning Bids
Consider now the following values:
v0 = 0 v 1 = 0 v 2 = 336 v 3 = 336 
Suppose this time that bidders 2 and 3 bid zero when their signal is 1/2o r
lowerandbid120whentheir signalis above 1/2 Consequently,bidders2and3
bid zero and 120 with positive probability each.
Consider again two signals, s1 and ¯ s1  f o rb i d d e r1s u c ht h a ts1 < 1/2 < ¯ s1 
Direct calculations now establish that, given the bidding functions of bidders
2 and 3, bidder 1’s unique best reply among the bids {0 120 167} is 167 when
his signal is s1  but his unique best reply when his signal increases to ¯ s1 is 120 
Thus SCC is again violated. However, this time the chosen bids, 120 and 167 
are individually rational. Note, however, that 120 ties as a winning bid with1114 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
positive probability. The relevant calculations are as follows:
V1(b1 = 167 b2 b3|s1) =
1
4
(0+0+336+336)−167= 1 
V1(b1 = 120 b2 b3|s1) =
1
4
(0−120)+
1
4
 
1
2
 
(336−120)
+
1
4
 
1
2
 
(0−120)
+
1
4
 
1
3
 
(336−120)= 0 
V1(b1 = 0 b2 b3|s1) =
1
4
 
1
3
 
(0−0) = 0 
V1(b1 = 167 b2 b3|¯ s1) =
1
6
336+
1
3
336−167= 1 
V1(b1 = 120 b2 b3|¯ s1) =
1
6
(0−120)+
1
6
 
1
2
 
(336−120)
+
1
3
 
1
2
 
(0−120)
+
1
3
 
1
3
 
(336−120)= 2 
V1(b1 = 0 b2 b3|¯ s1) =
1
6
 
1
3
 
(0−0) = 0 
4. IRT-SCC: PROOF SKETCH
We now provide a sketch of the proof of IRT-SCC. For simplicity, suppose
there are three bidders, 1, 2, and 3, each with a reserve price of zero. Consider
two bids, ¯ b1 >b 1 > 0 for bidder 1, and suppose that bidders 2 and 3 each em-
ploy a strictly increasing bidding function with the property that bidder j = 2 3
bids below b1 when sj <s j and bids between b1 and ¯ b1 when sj ∈ (sj ¯ sj)  So,
consulting Figure 2, bidder 1 wins with a bid of ¯ b1 when (s2 s 3) is in any one of
the cells Ak  and wins with a bid of b1 when (s2 s 3) is in cell A0.12 Assume that
each Ak has positive probability conditional on any signal for bidder 1.
Consider two signals, s1 < ¯ s1  f o rb i d d e r1 .O u ro b j e c t i v ei st oi l l u s t r a t et h e
role played by individual rationality and the absence of ties in obtaining single
crossing for bidder 1 with respect to his bids, b1 < ¯ b1  and his signals, s1 < ¯ s1 
12Ties occur with probability zero given the strictly increasing functions of bidders 2 and 3.ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1115
FIGURE 2.—Payoff difference from b1 = ¯ b1 vs. b1 = b1.
Single crossing requires, in part, that if ¯ b1 is at least as good as b1 when 1’s
signal is s1  then the same is true when his signal increases to ¯ s1 
Note that ties have already been ruled out by supposing that bidders 2 and 3
employ strictly increasing bidding functions. Indeed, this has been incorpo-
rated into Figure 2; there are no cells in which bidder 1 wins with probability
other than zero or one. Consequently, single crossing cannot fail because of
ties. To ensure that single crossing cannot fail because bids are individually
irrational, it is enough to suppose that bidder 1’s low bid, b1  is individually
rational at his high signal, ¯ s1 
We wish now to demonstrate that single crossing holds for bidder 1. Consult
Figure 2. The ex-post difference in 1’s payoff from bidding ¯ b1 versus b1  which
we shall denote by  (s)  is u1(¯ b1 s)− u1(b1 s) when the signals of bidders
2and3ar einc e llA0  whileitis simplyu1(¯ b1 s)in theother three cellsbecause
b1 loses in those cells.
Let A denote the union of the four cells, i.e., the event that ¯ b1 is a winning
bid. Consequently, when his signal is s1  the difference in 1’s payoff from bid-
ding ¯ b1 versus b1 is Pr(A|s1)E( (S)|A s1)  Single crossing requires that
Pr(A|s1)E( (S)|A s1) ≥ 0  ⇒ Pr(A|¯ s1)E( (S)|A ¯ s1) ≥ 0 
But because ¯ b1 wins with positive probability regardless of 1’s signal, both
Pr(A|¯ s1) and Pr(A|s1) are positive. Hence, single crossing holds if
E( (S)|A s1) ≤ E( (S)|A ¯ s1)  (4.1)
Consequently, we may restrict attention to signals of bidders 2 and 3 that lie
in A 
Now, because  (s) is nondecreasing in s1  if it were also nondecreasing in
(s2 s 3) on A  then (4.1) would follow from the following monotonicity result
due to Milgrom and Weber (1982, Theorem 5): If X1     X n are afﬁliated1116 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
and φ(x1     x n) is a nondecreasing real-valued function, then the expecta-
tion of φ, conditional on any number of events of the form Xk ∈[ ak b k]  is
nondecreasing in all the ak and bk  where ak = bk is permitted.
However,  (s) can fail to be nondecreasing in (s2 s 3). For example, if at
some point on the border between A0 and A1 u 1(b1 s)<0  then  (s) strictly
decreases as (s2 s 3) increases through that point from just below the border to
just above it. Hence, Milgrom and Weber’s result does not apply.
Fortunately, an extension of their result that requires only an average form
of monotonicity on the cells Ak does apply (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix).
In the present example, this average form of monotonicity is that for k = 1 2 
E
 
u1(¯ b1 s)−u1(b1 s)|A0  ¯ s1
 
(4.2)
≤E
 
u1(¯ b1 s)|Ak ¯ s1
 
≤ E
 
u1(¯ b1 s)|A3 ¯ s1
 
 
Hence, to establish (4.1) we need only show that (4.2) holds.
The inequality on the right in (4.2) follows from Milgrom and Weber’s
monotonicity result. To obtain the inequality on the left we use the individ-
ual rationality of the bid b1 at ¯ s1.N o t et h a tab i do fb1 wins precisely when
the others’ signals are in region A0  and this occurs with positive probability.
Hence, individual rationality implies
E
 
u1(b1 S)|A0 ¯ s1
 
≥ 0  (4.3)
The inequality on the left in (4.2) then follows since, for k = 1 2 
E
 
u1(¯ b1 S)|Ak ¯ s1
 
≥ E
 
u1(¯ b1 S)|A0 ¯ s1
 
≥ E
 
u1(¯ b1 S)−u1(b1 S)|A0 ¯ s1
 
 
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Milgrom and Weber’s monotonicity re-
sult and the second follows from (4.3). Hence, (4.1), and therefore also single
crossing, holds.
5. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SIGNALS: A PRIVATE VALUE COUNTEREXAMPLE
We now provide a private value example suggesting that Theorem 2.1 fails if
the bidders’ signals are not one-dimensional. The example possesses a unique
equilibrium, which is pure and nonmonotone.
The example is only suggestive because, while it satisﬁes the multi-
dimensional signal analogue of Assumption A.1, it involves several extreme
distributional speciﬁcations. For example, some signals are discrete random
variables rather than continuous ones, and some signals are perfectly corre-
lated with others. Consequently, the joint signal distribution has no density
function and so, formally, Assumption A.2 fails. However, the signals in ourASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1117
example are afﬁliated, and we conjecture that no smoothed nearby example
satisfying A.1 and A.2 will possess a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium ei-
ther.13 But this remains an open question.
There are three bidders, 1 2, and 3, each with a zero reserve price, and so
the losing bid l is strictly less than zero. All bidders observe a public signal, Y 
which affects only the values of bidders 2 and 3. In addition, bidder 1 receives
ap r i v a t es i g n a l ,X  which determines his value, and bidders 2 and 3 observe a
common signal Z, which affects their value.
One interpretation is that these are three ﬁrms bidding on a contract to up-
grade their computer systems to enhance production. Firm 1 is a monopolist
in market A and −X is a signal about the cost of his inputs. Firms 2 and 3
compete in market B and Y is a public signal about demand in market B, while
−Z is a signal about the common cost of inputs to ﬁrms 2 and 3 in market B.
Another interpretation, suggested by a referee, focuses on information leak-
age. Speciﬁcally, bidder 1 receives signal X  bidder 2 receives Y, and bidder 3
receives Z  In addition, it is common knowledge that bidder 1 spies on 2 and
ﬁnds out Y  b i d d e r2s p i e so n3a n dﬁ n d so u tZ  and bidder 3 spies on 2 and
ﬁnds out Y  This interpretation is particularly interesting because bidders will
typically have an incentive to ﬁnd out their opponents’ signals, if only to better
predict their bids. Hence, whether the opportunity to ﬁnd out others’ signals is
present can be an important issue.
So, altogether, bidder 1 receives the two-dimensional signal S1 = (X Y) 
while bidders 2 and 3 each receive the common two-dimensional signal S2 =
S3 = (Y Z)  Let us suppose that X and Y are i.i.d. random variables taking on
the values 0 and 1 with probability 1/2 each, and Z is independently and uni-
formlydistributed on [0 1]∪[2 3] Consequently,thesixreal randomvariables
(S1 S 2 S 3) = (X Y Y Z Y Z)are afﬁliated.
The bidders have private values and quasilinear utilities. Bidder 1’s value is
v1(x y)= 6x 
while bidders 2 and 3 have identical values v2(y z)= v3(y z) = v(y z)  where
v(y z)=
 
7i f y = 1 z∈[ 2 3],
z otherwise.
PROPOSITION 5.1: The above ﬁrst-price auction example possesses a unique
equilibrium outcome. Every equilibrium is (up to ex ante probability zero events)
pure, nonmonotone, and of the following form: For y = 0 1 and a.e. z  b1(0 y)∈
{l 0} b 1(1 0) = 3 b 1(1 1) = 1; bj(y z) = v(y z), j = 2 3  Thus, the only
nonuniqueness concerns bidder 1’s strategy and whether, when X = 0  he bids
l or 0  both of which lose with probability one.
13Arbitrarily nearby examples satisfying A.1 and A.2 exist.1118 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
The proof can be found in Reny and Zamir (2002), but the argument is
straightforward. Because bidders 2 and 3 have identical values, and because
their signals are also identical, their identical values are common knowledge
between them. Consequently, a standard Bertrand competition argument es-
tablishes that bidders 2 and 3 must each bid their value in equilibrium. Hence,
bidders 2 and 3 employ monotone pure strategies. It remains only to ﬁnd bid-
der 1’s best reply.
When 1’s signal S1 = (x y) = (0 y) a best reply for bidder 1 requires bid-
ding so that he loses with probability one, because his value is v1 = 6x = 0 
Hence, he must bid either l or 0  The interesting case is when x = 1 
When S1 = (x y) = (1 0)  bidder 1’s value is v1 = 6 and he knows that
Y = 0  Consequently, he knows that the common bid of bidders 2 and 3 is
v(0 Z)= Z  which is uniformly distributed on [0 1]∪[2 3]  and a straightfor-
ward calculation establishes that 1’s unique best reply is to bid 3.
However, when S1 = (x y) = (1 1)  bidder 1’s value is again v1 = 6  but he
now knows that Y = 1  Consequently, he knows that bidders 2 and 3 each bid
v(1 Z)= 7i fZ ∈[ 2 3] while they each bid v(1 Z)= Z if Z ∈[ 0 1]  Clearly, it
wouldbe suboptimalforbidder1to bid7ormoresince hisvalueisonly6.Con-
sequently, bidder 1 will bid less than 7 and so can condition on the event that
2 and 3 bid less than 7 as well. But, conditional on bidding less than 7  bidders
2 and 3 submit a common bid that is uniformly distributed on [0 1]  Another
straightforward calculation establishes that bidder 1’s unique best reply now is
to bid 1.
Hence, every best reply for bidder 1 is nonmonotone, with his bid falling
from 3 to 1 when his signal increases from (1 0) to (1 1) 
One reason for the failure of monotonicity here is the failure of afﬁliation
to be inherited by monotone functions of multi-dimensional afﬁliated random
variables. Speciﬁcally, even though the random variables Y and Z are inde-
pendent and hence afﬁliated, the random variables Y and v(Y Z) are not
afﬁliated, despite the fact that v(Y Z) is nondecreasing. To see this, observe
that
Pr(v(Y Z) ∈[ 2 3]|Y = 0)
Pr(v(Y Z) ∈[ 0 1]|Y = 0)
= 1 > 0 =
Pr(v(Y Z) ∈[ 2 3]|Y = 1)
Pr(v(Y Z) ∈[ 0 1]|Y = 1)
 
Consequently, in the example, one of the dimensions of bidder 1’s signal, Y 
is not afﬁliated with the equilibrium bids of the other bidders.
6. SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS: A COUNTEREXAMPLE
Returning to the one-dimensional signal setting, one might wonder whether
second-price auctions admit monotone pure-strategy equilibria under As-
sumptions A.1 and A.2.14 The answer is trivially “yes” if dominated strategies
14We thank a referee for asking precisely this question.ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1119
are permitted and if for some bidder i, E(ui(ri S)|si) ≥ 0f o ra l lsi ∈[ 0 1].I n
this case there is always an equilibrium in which, regardless of his signal, bid-
der i bids ˜ b>r i such that for all j  = i  uj(˜ b s) < 0f o ra l ls  and all others
drop out by bidding l. Hence, the substantive question is: Under Assumptions
A.1 and A.2, does a second-price auction necessarily possess a monotone pure-
strategy equilibrium in undominated strategies? The answer is “no,” and we now
provide an example. For the sake of brevity, the signals in the example are dis-
crete and some are perfectly correlated. However, the example can easily be
smoothed so that it satisﬁes both A.1 and A.2.
There are three bidders. Bidder i receives signal si  Bidder 1’s value is
v1 = s1+s2  while bidders 2 and 3 have private values; v2 = s2 and v3 = s3  Each
bidder receives either a high or a low signal. Speciﬁcally, s1 ∈{1 2} s 2 ∈{ 0 4} 
and s3 ∈{ 0 3}  Bidders 1 and 3 have perfectly correlated signals, both being
low with probability 1/2 or both being high with probability 1/2. Bidder2’s sig-
nal is independent of the others’, being low with probability p and high with
probability 1−p  where p ∈ (2/3 1)  The bidders’ signals are therefore afﬁli-
ated.
Because bidders 2 and 3 have private values, their only undominated strat-
egy is to bid their value. Bidders 2 and 3 therefore each employ a pure
nondecreasing bid function. It remains only to compute an undominated best
reply for bidder 1.
When s1 = 1  bidder 1 knows that b3(s3) = s3 = 0  Since 1’s value is v1 =
1 + s2  his value is 1 if b2(s2) = s2 = 0, while it is 5 if b2(s2) = s2 = 4  Conse-
quently, 1’s value is always strictly above the high bid of the others and so it is
optimal for him to bid so that he wins with probability one. Because p<1  this
requires a bid above 4  However, when s1 = 1 his value is never more than 5 
and so in any undominated equilibrium we must have b1(1)∈ (4 5] 
When s1 = 2  bidder 1 knows that b3(s3) = s3 = 3  Consequently, a bid
above 4 still wins with probability one, but bidder 1 now pays 3 when b2(s2) =
s2 = 0a n dv1 = 2  and pays 4 when b2(s2) = s2 = 4a n dv1 = 6  Hence, a bid
above 4 yields bidder 1 a payoff of p(2−3)+(1−p)(6−4) which is negative
because p>2/3  Similarly, any bid weakly between 3 and 4 yields a negative
payoff. Consequently, we must have b1(2)<3  Hence, an undominated pure-
strategy equilibrium exists, but in no such equilibrium is bidder 1’s strategy
nondecreasing.
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APPENDIX
We begin with our extension of Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber (1982). In Rk  call the
product of k real intervals—each of which can be closed, open or half-open—a cell. If C and C 
are cells in Rk  then we will write C ≤ C  if the lower (upper) endpoint of each interval in the
product deﬁning C is no greater than the lower (upper) endpoint of the corresponding interval
in the product deﬁning C  15
Af u n c t i o nh:[0 1]k → R is cellwise nondecreasing with respect to the density g:[0 1]k → R+ if
there is a ﬁnite partition, {Ci}  of [0 1]k into cells such that, (i) the restriction of h to each cell is
nondecreasing, and (ii) Eg(h|Ci) ≤ Eg(h|Cj) whenever Ci ≤ Cj 
Evidently, by considering the partition consisting of the single cell [0 1]k  every nondecreasing
function on [0 1]k is cellwise nondecreasing for every density. On the other hand, a function can
be cellwise nondecreasing with respect to a given density without being nondecreasing on its
domain. Our extension of Milgrom and Weber’s monotonicity result is as follows.
LEMMA A.1: Suppose that h:[0 1]n+m → R  that X1     X n Y 1     Y m are afﬁliated random
variables with joint strictly positive density g:[0 1]n+m → R++  and that ¯ x ≥ x are vectors in [0 1]n 
If X = (X1     X n)  Y =(Y1     Y m)  and:
(i) for every y ∈[ 0 1]m h ( x  y )is nondecreasing in x on [0 1]n  and
(ii) h(x ·) is cellwise nondecreasing w.r.t g(·|X = x) when x = ¯ x or x 
then E[h(X Y)|X = x]≤E[h(X Y)|X = ¯ x].
PROOF:W ep r o v i d et h ep r o o ff o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hh(¯ x ·) is cellwise nondecreasing w.r.t
g(·|X = ¯ x)  the other case being similar. Let {Ci} denote the associated partition of [0 1]m 
Hence, the step function, φ:[0 1]m → R deﬁned by φ(y)= E[h(X Y)|X = ¯ x Y ∈ Ci] if y ∈ Ci 
is nondecreasing. Therefore,
E[h(X Y)|X = x]=
 
i
Pr(C
i|X = x)E[h(X Y)|X = x Y∈ C
i]
≤
 
i
Pr(C
i|X = x)E[h(X Y)|X = ¯ x Y ∈ C
i]
= E[φ(Y)|X = x]
≤ E[φ(Y)|X = ¯ x]
=
 
i
Pr(C
i|X = ¯ x)E[h(X Y)|X = ¯ x Y ∈ C
i]
= E[h(X Y)|X = ¯ x] 
where the two inequalities follow from Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber (1982), henceforth
MW. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3: To establish IRT-SCC, ﬁx ¯ bi >b i and, for all j  = i  ﬁx non-
decreasing bid functions, bj,s ot h a tP r (l < maxj =i bj(Sj) = ¯ bi or bi) = 0  In what follows, all
statements about i’s payoff, etc., correspond to these ﬁxed bid functions of the others.
Clearly, if bi = ¯ bi or bi  then the probability that bi is among the highest serious bids is equal
to the probability that bi is the unique highest bid (and hence serious). Moreover, because f>0
and the event that bi is uniquely highest depends only upon the others’ signals, this event (and
15So, in R2, for example, (a1 b 1]×[ a2 b 2) ≤ (a 
1 b  
1) × (a 
2 b  
2) if ai ≤ a 
i and bi ≤ b 
i  for
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any other with this property) has positive probability if and only if it has positive probability
conditional on every si ∈[ 0 1]  These facts will be used repeatedly in what follows.
Let A denote the event that ¯ bi is a winning bid. That is,
A =
 
s−i ∈[ 0 1]
N−1 :max
j =i
bj(sj)<¯ bi
 
 
If bi wins with probability zero, then Vi(bi b−i|si) = 0 for every si  Consequently, IRT-SCC holds
because, by MW Theorem 5, E(ui(¯ bi S)|si A)is nondecreasing in si whenever A has positive
probability. Consequently, wecan assumethat bi wins with positive probability. A fortiori, ¯ bi wins
with positive probability and so A has positive probability.
Partition A as follows. For every subset J of {1     N}\{i}  deﬁne
A(J) = A∩{s−i ∈[ 0 1]
N−1: ∀j  = i bj(sj) ≥ bi iff j ∈ J} 
Hence, ignoring ties, A(J) is the event that bi loses against precisely those bidders in J.B e c a u s e
A(J) is contained in A  ¯ bi wins against every j  = i in each event A(J)  Note that A(∅)  being
the event that bi loses against no one, is the event that bi wins the auction ands oh a sp o s i t i v e
probability.
Because both ¯ bi and bi win with positive probability and tie the maximum of the others’ bids
with probability zero, IRT-SCC reduces to the following: For ¯ si >s i 
E
 
ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A si
 
≥ 0  ⇒ E
 
ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A ¯ si
 
≥ 0 (A.1)
when E(ui(¯ bi S)|A si) ≥ 0  and
E
 
ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A ¯ si
 
≤ 0  ⇒ E
 
(ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A si
 
≤ 0 (A.2)
when E[ui(bi S)|A(∅)  ¯ si]≥0 
Now, by MW Theorem 5, E[ui(¯ bi S)|A si]≥0i m p l i e sE[ui(¯ bi S)|A ¯ si]≥0  Conse-
quently, if in addition E[ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A ¯ si] < 0  then (A.1) holds simply because the second
difference is positive, being the difference between a nonnegative and a negative number.
Hence, it sufﬁces to establish (A.1) and (A.2) when E[ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A ¯ si]≥0  or equiva-
lently, when E[ui(bi S)|A(∅)  ¯ si]≥0  We shall in fact show more than this, namely, that if
E[ui(bi S)|A(∅)  ¯ si]≥0  then
E
 
ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A si
 
≤ E
 
ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)I A(∅)|A ¯ si
 
  (A.3)
To see this, let  i(s) = ui(¯ bi s)− ui(bi s)I A(∅), and note that  i(si s −i) is nondecreasing in si
on [0 1]  Hence, by LemmaA.1, it sufﬁcesto show that  i(¯ si ·):A→ R is cellwise nondecreasing
with respect to f(s −i|A ¯ si)  Consider the above ﬁnite partition, {A(J)}  of A into cells. We may
restrict attention to those subsets J such that A(J) is nonempty.
If A(J )≥ A(J),t h e n
E[ui(¯ bi S)|A(J
 )  ¯ si]≥E[ui(¯ bi S)|A(J)  ¯ si]
follows from MW Theorem 5. Furthermore, because every A(J) ≥ A(∅) 
E[ui(¯ bi S)|A(J)  ¯ si]≥E[ui(¯ bi S)|A(∅) ¯ si]≥E[ui(¯ bi S)−ui(bi S)|A(∅)  ¯ si] 
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from MW Theorem 5, and the second follows because
E[ui(bi S)|A(∅)  ¯ si]≥0  Hence,  i(¯ si ·) is cellwise nondecreasing. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1: Part 1. In this part of the proof we consider a modiﬁed ﬁrst-price
auction game. There are two modiﬁcations. First, we restrict the bidders to ﬁnite sets of bids.
Each ﬁnite set contains the losing bid, l  but no two sets have any serious bid in common. This
means that ties can only occur at bids of l. Second, we restrict the bidders’ strategies so that each1122 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
bidder must bid l when his signal is in [0 ε) where ε ∈ (0 1) is ﬁxed.16 Therefore, because the
joint density of signals is strictly positive on [0 1]N  any serious bid submitted by a bidder wins
with strictly positive probability regardless of his signal. The import of this will be explained in
the second part of the proof. We now wish to show the following:
Under the two modiﬁcations above, a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
To establish this, it would sufﬁce to verify the single-crossing condition (SCC) employed in
Athey (2001). We could then appeal to Athey’s Theorem 1. However, as we have seen, SCC
does not hold in our setting. Fortunately, Athey’s ﬁnite-action existence proof goes through if the
following, more permissive, best-reply single-crossing condition holds in our modiﬁed auction.
BR-SCC: If b 
i is a best reply for si against b−i  and bi is feasible for si, then the inequality
Vi(b 
i b−i|s 
i) ≥ Vi(bi b−i|s 
i) holds for all s 
i >s i if b 
i >b i  while it holds for all s 
i <s i if b 
i <b i 
Our modiﬁed auction will therefore possess a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium if BR-
SCC holds, which we now establish. Suppose that b 
i is a best reply for si against the others’
monotone strategy b−i  Because the bids l and bi are feasible, we must have Vi(b 
i b−i|si) ≥
max(Vi(bi b−i|si) Vi(l b−i|si)) ≥ 0  Hence, in addition to being as good as bi b  
i is individu-
ally rational for i at si  Also, because the only common bid available to distinct bidders is l,
Pr(l < maxj =ibj(Sj) =b 
i or bi) =0  Hence, by Proposition 2.3, Vi(b 
i b−i|s 
i) ≥ Vi(bi b−i|s 
i) holds
for all s 
i >s i if b 
i >b i  while it holds for all s 
i <s i if b 
i <b i  This establishes BR-SCC for the
modiﬁed auction and so it possesses a monotone pure-strategy equilibrium.17
Part 2. In this part of the proof, we consider a sequence of monotone equilibria of the modiﬁed
auctions from Part 1. For n = 1 2     let Gn denote the modiﬁed auction in which ε = 1/n and
bidder i’s ﬁnite set of bids is denoted by Bn
i . Note then that l ∈ Bn
i for each n  Further, suppose
thatBn
i ⊇ B
n−1
i andthat
 
nBn
i is densein Bi.Le tbn denotea monotone pure-strategyequilibrium
of Gn  By A.1(ii), for every i there exists ˜ b ≥ ri such that ui(b s) < 0f o ra l lb>˜ b and all s ∈
[0 1]N. Consequently, because all serious bids for i win with positive probability, and because
the bid l is available in Gn,e a c hbn
i is bounded above by ˜ b; and of course bn
i is bounded below
by l  Hence, by Helley’s theorem, we may assume without loss that for every i  bn
i (s) → ˆ bi(s)
for a.e. si ∈[ 0 1]  where each ˆ bi is nondecreasing on [0 1]  We shall argue that ˆ b is a monotone
equilibrium of the ﬁrst-price auction game.
The argument would be trivial were it not for the possibility of ties, which lead to discontinu-
ities in payoffs. There are two points at which ties must be carefully considered. The ﬁrst arises
when considering a bidder i’s payoff from any bid against the limit strategies, ˆ b−i  of the others.
It must be shown that, given his signal, bidder i can either approximate arbitrarily well or im-
prove upon his payoff by employing a slightly higher bid that, with probability one, does not tie
the others’ bids. This is demonstrated in (A.5), a result that depends upon the tie-break property
that a high bidder’s probability of winning does not increase when additional bidders tie for the
winning bid.
Ties must also be handled carefully when considering the limit of a bidder’s payoff as the grid
of bids becomes ﬁner and ﬁner. While the a priori possibility of ties at the limit can render the
limiting payoff distinct from the payoff at the limit, the limiting payoff, it is shown, can always be
obtained by employing the limit strategies, ˆ b, together with some surrogate tie-breaking rule that
is a function of the vector of signals alone. Demonstrating that ties in fact occur with probability
zero under ˆ b requires establishing that, even against such surrogate tie-breaking rules, a bidder
16Athey (2001) also employs this device.
17Note that our example of the second failure of SCC in Section 5 demonstrates that BR-SCC
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can approximate or improve upon his payoff by increasing his bid slightly. As before, the details
of the surrogate tie-breaking rule are critical for establishing this result.
Throughout the remainder of the proof it will be convenient to maintain two conventions
regarding the bid b = l  First, deﬁne ui(l s)= 0f o ra l li and all s  and second, when b =l deﬁne
b  ↓ b to mean b  = b  since l is isolated.
Because l ∈ Bn
i  V i(bn) ≥ 0f o ra l li and n  Hence, for every i and a.e. si such that ˆ bi(si)>land
Pr(maxj =i ˆ bj(Sj) ≤ ˆ bi(si)|si)>0  the following holds for n large enough:
0 ≤ E
 
ui(b
n
i (si) S)|si max
j =i
b
n
j(Sj) ≤ b
n
i (si)
 
(A.4)
≤ E
 
ui(b
n
i (si) S)|si max
j =i
b
n
j(Sj) ≤ ˆ bi(si)+δ
 
→ E
 
ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si max
j =i
ˆ bj(Sj) ≤ ˆ bi(si)
 
 
where the ﬁrst line follows because ˆ bi(si)>limplies bn
i (si) is serious for n large enough, implying
both that it wins with positive probability (given our strategy restriction), and that the right-hand
side is si’s payoff because ties in Gn cannot occur at serious bids; the second line follows for any
δ>0 by MW Theorem 5; and the third line follows by taking the limit ﬁrst as n →∞and then
as δ ↓ 0 along a sequence such that ˆ bi(si) + δ is never one of the at most countably many mass
points of maxj =i ˆ bj(Sj)  ensuring that the ﬁrst limit, in n  exists for each such δ.18
Let λi(b b−i) denote the probability that i wins when the vector of bids is (b b−i)  Sup-
pose that Vi(b  ˆ b−i|si) ≥ 0f o rs o m eb i db and some signal si of bidder i  Then, letting Hi =
{s−i :max j =i ˆ bj(sj) ≤b} and deﬁning E(·|si H i) = 0i fP r (Hi|si)= 0, we have the following:
0 ≤ Vi(b  ˆ b−i|si) (A.5)
= Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(b S)λi(b  ˆ b−i(S−i))|si H i]
≤ Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(b S)|si H i]E[λi(b  ˆ b−i(S−i))|si H i]
≤ Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(b S)|si H i]
= lim
b ↓b
Vi(b
   ˆ b−i|si) 
where the inequality on the third line follows from MW Theorem 23, because ui(b si S −i) and
1−λi(b  ˆ b−i(S−i))  given uniform tie-breaking, are nondecreasingin S−i and so (becausethe con-
ditioning event is a sublattice) the conditional expectation of their product is no smaller than the
product of their conditional expectations, and the inequality on the fourth line follows because,
under uniform tie-breaking, Pr(Hi|si)>0i m p l i e s0<E[λi(b  ˆ b−i(S−i))|si H i]≤1.19
18Obtaining nonnegativity of the limit in (A.4) is precisely where the restriction on strategies
in Gn is required.
19In particular,(A.5) shows that, underthe uniform tie-breaking rule,payoffs from bids that tie
for the winning bid with positive probability can be approximated or improved upon by slightly
higher bids that tie with probability zero. This fact is not obvious because, unlike the private
value setting, winner’s curse effects can make it costly to always “win the tie” by bidding slightly
higher. A slightly higher bid implies that a bidder wins for sure even in the “bad news” events
in which he wins and only a small number (one say) of the other bidders would have tied with
him. Conditional on such events, the higher bid can make him worse off. But under uniform tie-
breaking, the beneﬁt of ensuring that he also wins in the “good news”events in which he wins and
many bidders would have tied with him, outweighs this cost. This is not true for all tie-breaking
rules.1124 P. J. RENY AND S. ZAMIR
Because the probability that i wins, λi(bi b −i)  is nondecreasing in bi and nonincreasing
in b−i, λi(bn(s)) is a sequence of functions each of which is monotone in each of its arguments,
s1     s N  being nondecreasing in si and nonincreasing in s−i  Hence, by Helley’s theorem, there
exists αi :[0 1]N →[ 0 1]  nondecreasing in si and nonincreasing in s−i  such that (extracting a
subsequence if necessary) λi(bn(s)) →n αi(s) for a.e. s ∈[ 0 1]N  Consequently,
 
i αi(s) ≤ 1a . e .
s ∈[ 0 1]N  and for every i and a.e. si V i(bn
i (si) bn
−i|si) = E[ui(bn
i (si) S)λi(bn(S))|si] converges
to E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)αi(S)|si]  by the dominated convergence theorem. Hence, one can think of αi(·)
as a surrogate tie-breaking rule that, were it actually employed at the limit, would yield continuity
of payoffs there.
Because each ˆ bj(Sj) has at most countably many mass points and Bn
i becomes dense in Bi,f o r
every b ∈ Bi  every ε>0  and a.e. si  there exists ¯ n ≥ 1a n d¯ b ∈ B¯ n
i such that
lim
b ↓b
Vi(b
   ˆ b−i|si) ≤ Vi(¯ b  ˆ b−i|si)+ε
≤ Vi(¯ b b
n
−i|si)+2ε for n ≥ ¯ n 
≤ Vi(b
n
i (si) b
n
−i|si)+2ε for n ≥ ¯ n 
where the ﬁrst and second lines follow because ¯ b can be chosen so that the probability that any
ˆ bj(Sj) equals ¯ b is arbitrarily small, and the third line follows because ¯ b ∈ B
¯ n
i is feasible in Gn
for every n ≥ ¯ n and bn is an equilibrium. Because ε>0 is arbitrary, as is b in (A.5), we obtain,
because l ∈ Bi yields a payoff of zero, the following for all i and a.e. si:
sup
b∈Bi
Vi(b  ˆ b−i|si) ≤ lim
n Vi(b
n
i (si) b
n
−i|si) (A.6)
= E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)αi(S)|si] 
For a.e. si such that ˆ bi(si)>l, letting Hi ={ S−i:max j =i ˆ bj(Sj)≤ ˆ bi(si)},w eh a v e
0 ≤ E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)αi(S)|si]
= Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)αi(S)|si H i]
≤ Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si H i]E[αi(S)|si H i]
≤ Pr(Hi|si)E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si H i]
= lim
ε↓0
Vi(ˆ bi(si)+ε  ˆ b−i|si)
≤ sup
b∈Bi
Vi(b  ˆ b−i|si) 
wherethe ﬁrst line follows from (A.6), the second line follows because αi(si s −i) = 0a . e .s−i / ∈ Hi 
the third line follows from MW Theorem 23 (as in (A.5)), and the fourth line follows because
αi(·) ∈[ 0 1] and, by (A.4), Pr(Hi|si)>0i m p l i e sE[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si H i]≥0 20 Hence, by the in-
20Note the importance of αi(si s −i) being nonincreasing in s−i. The third line can fail other-
wise. For example, consider two risk-neutral bidders with uniform [0 1] i.i.d. signals, and where
bidder i’svalue is sj  theotherbidder’s signal. If thesurrogate tie-breaking rule, αi(·)  is such that
upon a tie the bidder with the highest value wins, then αi(·) is increasing in the opponent’s signal.
The third line now fails if ˆ bi(·) = 1/2f o ri = 1 2  since bidding above or below 1/2i st h e nstrictly
suboptimal whenever si ∈ (0 1).( H e n c e ,ˆ bi(·) = 1/2f o ri = 1 2 is an equilibrium under this sur-
rogate tie-breaking rule and both players earn positive ex-ante payoffs. Thus, while Maskin and
Riley’s (2000) Proposition 4 is valid for the tie-breaking rule they actually employ, this example
demonstrates that it is not valid for all tie-breaking rules, contrary to their footnote 9.)ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 1125
equality on line six and (A.6), the inequalities on lines three, four, and six must be equalities. In
particular, if Pr(Hi|si)>0  then
0 ≤ E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si H i]E[αi(S)|si H i]=E[ui(ˆ bi(si) S)|si H i]  (A.7)
and, because ui(b s) is strictly increasing in si and Hi increases appropriately (as a set)
with si  MW Theorem 5 implies that the inequality in (A.7) must be strict, and therefore
E[αi(S)|si H i]=1  for a.e. si such that Pr(Hi|si)>0 
Consequently, given ∅  = I ⊆{ 1     N} and letting TI ={ s: ˆ bi(si) = maxj ˆ bj(sj)>l  ∀i ∈ I} 
if Pr(TI)>0 then for every i ∈ I, αi(s) = 1f o ra . e .s ∈ TI  But
 
i∈I αi(s) ≤ 1a . e .s ∈[ 0 1]N
then implies that #I = 1  Hence, the probability that, under ˆ b  two or more bidders simul-
taneously submit the highest bid above l  is zero. But then for every i and a.e. si V i(·|si) is
continuous at (ˆ bi(si)  ˆ b−i), being continuous there whenever ˆ bi(si) = l because l is isolated.
Therefore, limn Vi(bn
i (si) bn
−i|si) = Vi(ˆ bi(si)  ˆ b−i|si) a.e. si  and so (A.6) implies that ˆ b is an equi-
librium. Q.E.D.
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